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STATE OF SLAYER'S ESTATE
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects an
individual from deprivation of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law.' An individual has an entitled right to fair treatment by the
government. 2 Massachusetts recognizes that a husband and wife are part of
a tenancy by the entirety in which each person owns the property as if they
were the "sole" and whole owner.3 Under a tenancy by the entirety,
survivorship rights exist where all property rights go to the survivor of the
marriage if predeceased by the other.' Husband and wife both have a vested
right in the property.' Massachusetts's slayer statute prohibits any person
charged with an unlawful killing of the decedent from taking any part of the
decedent's estate, even if a joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety exists
between slayer and decedent.'
See U.S. CONST. amend. V (explaining Fifth Amendment right).
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall
any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
Id.
2 See id. (explaining due process of law under Fifth Amendment).
3 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 209, § 1 (LexisNexis 2017) ("The real and personal property of
any person shall, upon marriage, remain the separate property of such person, and a married person
may receive, receipt for, hold, manage and dispose of property, real and personal, in the same
manner as if such person were sole.").
4 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 191, § 15 (LexisNexis 2017) (explaining survivorship rights of
tenancy by entirety).
See SHELDON F. KURTZ, MOYNIHAN'S INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 286
(4'h ed. 2005) (explaining tenancy by entirety is characterized by time, title, interest, and
possession).
6 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (showing text of slayer statute).
The court shall prohibit any person charged with the unlawful killing of the decedent
from taking from the decedent's estate through its distribution and disposition, including
property held between the person charged and the decedent in joint tenancy or by tenancy
in the entirety. The court shall consider any person convicted of the unlawful killing of
the decedent as predeceasing the decedent for the purpose of distribution and disposition
of the decedent's estate including property held between the person charged and the
decedent in joint tenancy or by tenancy in the entirety. The bar to succession shall apply
only to murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or manslaughter; it shall
not include vehicular homicide or negligent manslaughter in the death of the decedent.
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The Massachusetts slayer statute's purpose is to prevent a criminal
from "gaining a profit" from a crime he or she commits.' The Massachusetts
statute strays from its purpose and the legislature's goal by taking away the
rights of individuals solely for committing a crime.' The slayer statute
eliminates all property rights of an individual regardless of whether those
rights were obtained through a tenancy by the entirety.' Therefore, the
statute unconstitutionally takes away any property interest an individual
already possessed prior to committing a crime.10 It is unconstitutional to
deprive an individual from property that he or she already possessed a
preexisting interest in without due process of law." The Massachusetts
slayer statute violates the U.S. Constitution when it states that the killer is
treated as though he or she predeceased the deceased, thus making it appear
as though the killer has been divested of all their rights before the death of
the victim.12 Other states have recognized this as an unconstitutional
violation, and tailored their slayer statutes to sever a tenancy by the entirety
when a spouse kills the other, thus turning into a tenancy in common where

Id.
7 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 2-803(f) (West 2018) (explaining principle
that killer cannot profit from wrong applies); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION: QUASI
CONTRACTS & CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS § 188 cmt. a (1937) (states principle behind purpose of
slayer statue); Slocum v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 139 N.E. 816, 817 (Mass. 1923) ("That the person
who commits murder, or any person claiming under him or her, should be allowed to benefit by his
or her criminal act, would no doubt be contrary to public policy."); Diamond v. Ganci, 103 N.E.2d
716, 718 (Mass. 1952) (explaining answer depends on public policy rule which prevents murderers
from profiting from their wrong).
See e.g., In re Estate of Foleno ex rel. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2002) (describing purpose of slayer rule); Neiman v. Hurff, 93 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1952)
(stating no one is allowed to profit through his own wrongdoing); Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188,
190 (N.Y. 1889) ("No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his
own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.");
In re Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27,29 (Wis. 1981) ("The disqualification of a slayer is premised
on the maxim: Nullus commodum caperepotestde injuriasuapropria,no one can attain advantage
by his own wrong"); Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923, 925-26 (Del. Ch. 1951) (explaining no one
should be able to profit from crime).
9 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (stating tenancy by entirety is
included in forfeiture).
10 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating there shall be no deprivation of property without due
process of law); In re Estate ofFoleno, 772 N.E.2d at 496 ("To deprive the killer of his half of the
tenancy through a constructive trust would impose an unconstitutional forfeiture."); Nat'l City
Bank v. Bledsoe, 144 N.E.2d 710, 716 (Ind. 1957) ("These statutes would be unconstitutional if
they imposed a forfeiture of property as a penalty for the murder.").
1" See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating prohibition against deprivation of property rights
without due process); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. a (1937) (stating it is
unconstitutional to deprive someone of property); Colton, 80 A.2d at 925 (stating deprivation of
property rights would be violation against constitution).
12 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (explaining that individual
convicted of crime is considered to have predeceased victim).
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the surviving spouse is given their entitled half of the property, which does
not allow the killer to profit with survivorship rights.13
FACTS:
The Massachusetts slayer statute violates the United States
Constitution. 14 It takes vested property rights away from a husband or wife
that has killed their spouse. 1 The slayer statute needs to be amended by the
legislature to ensure the rights entitled to every American citizen under the
U.S. Constitution are not infringed upon." The slayer statute treats killers
as non-existent and punishes them unequally.17 It meets its purpose of not
letting criminals benefit from their crimes, but does so unconstitutionally and
differently than most states."
North Dakota is the only other state that has taken the same approach
as Massachusetts when constructing their slayer statute. 19 Most States that

13 See, e.g., Colton, 80 A.2d at 926 (stating it is equitable to assume net income would have
been evenly divided between spouses); In re Estate of Shields, 584 P.2d 139, 140 (Kan. 1978)
("When Victoria Shields murdered her husband and was subsequently convicted of second degree
murder, the joint tenancy was severed and terminated and she became a tenant in common with the
heirs of her husband. She retains an undivided one-half interest in the property."); Capoccia v.
Capoccia, 505 So. 2d 624, 625 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("An estate by the entirety is deemed
severed when one spouse murders the other, and the property is to be treated as if it had been
formerly held as a tenancy in common.").
14 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating deprivation of property is not allowed without due
process); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 188 cmt. a (1937) (discussing it is
unconstitutional under slayer statute to deprive someone of entitled property rights); Colton, 80
A.2d at 926 (explaining taking away preexisting rights is unconstitutional); John W. Wade,
Acquisition ofProperty by Willfully Killing Another - A Statutory Solution, 49 HARv. L. REv. 715,
725-26 (1936) ("If the interest is one which has already vested, it cannot be taken away without
violating the constitutional provisions as to forfeiture of estates.").
1s See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006) (codifying joint tenancies and tenancy by
entirety are not exceptions to this deprivation).
16 See id. (stating Massachusetts slayer statute).
" See id. (setting out rule that allows taking any interest shared with decedent away from
killer).
18 See id. (explaining it does not allow killers to gain any benefit from murder); Robert F.
Hennessy, Note, Property - The Limits Of Equity: Forfeiture, Double Jeopardy, And The
Massachusetts "Slayer Statute", 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 159, 160 (2009) (stating slayer statute
meets its purpose behind principle).
19 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-10-03 (2017) ("The intentional and felonious killing of the
decedent voids the interests of the killer in property held with the decedent at the time of the killing
as joint tenants with the right of survivorship."); Bradley Myers, Article, The New North Dakota
Slayer Statute: Does It Cause A Criminal Forfeiture?, 83 N.D. L. REV. 997, 999-1000 (2007)
("North Dakota has long had a legislatively adopted slayer statute on the books. Prior to the recent
change, the slayer statute provided that when one joint tenant killed another, the joint tenancy was
severed, with each party taking an equal share as tenants in common. The change adopted by the
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instituted a slayer statute have taken two different approaches on the issue:
1) the Severance approach; and 2) the Constructive Trust approach. 2 0 Both
approaches are structured as to not deprive the murderer of property he is
2
entitled to, while still not allowing the perpetrator to profit from the murder.
The Severance approach treats the tenancy by entirety like a divorce, where
the tenancy is severed in half and split equally between the slayer and the
victim's heirs.22 This approach recognizes a slayer's vested right before the
killing and still follows its principle purpose of not allowing a criminal to
benefit from a crime by diminishing their survivorship rights. 23 The
Constructive Trust approach shares some similarities with both the
Severance approach and how the Massachusetts slayer statute has been
constructed.24 It is similar to the Massachusetts slayer rule as it also
North Dakota Legislature alters this result by holding that the interest of the killer in the property
becomes void.").
20 See, e.g., Wade, supra note 14, at 715 (explaining out of states having slayer statute, thirty
of them require severance); Budwit v. Herr, 63 N.W.2d 841, 847 (Mich. 1954) (stating Michigan
uses severance approach); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848, 850-51 (Fla. 1951) (stating Florida
follows severance approach); Grose v. Holland, 211 S.W.2d 464,467 (Mo. 1948) (stating Missouri
follows severance approach); Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923, 925 (Del. Ch. 1951) ("The court
subjected the property to a constructive trust for the benefit of the decedent's heirs in order to
overcome the inequitable means utilized in an attempt to gain sole possession."); In re Estate of
Safran, 306 N.W.2d 27, 38 (Wis. 1981) (stating constructive trust was imposed on killer); In re
Estate of Safran, 306 N.W.2d at 84 (citing In Will of Wilson, 92 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Wis. 1958))
(holding "that the murderer may take under the will, but that he takes subject to a constructive trust
imposed for the benefit of alternate beneficiaries."); Bryant v. Bryant, 137 S.E. 188, 191-92 (N.C.
1927) (imposing constructive trust on killer).
21 See In re Estate ofSafran, 306 N.W.2d at 84 (explaining reasoning behind constructive trust
approach); Wilson, 92 N.W.2d at 284 ("By imposing a constructive trust upon the murderer, the
court is not making an exception to the provisions of the statutes, but is merely compelling the
murderer to surrender the profits of his crime and thus preventing his unjust enrichment."); In re
King's Estate, 52 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Wis. 1952) ("We believe that the last-mentioned result is the
most equitable and can be justified upon the theory that the murder operates as a severance of the
joint tenancy resulting in a tenancy in common whereby the murderer retains ownership to an
undivided one-half interest, but gains no title in, or enjoyment of, the other half, which other half
vests in the heirs-at-law and next of kin of the murdered joint tenant.").
22 See In re King's Estate, 52 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Wis. 1952). (conceptualizing severance
approach as splitting property in half); Budwit v. Herr, 63 N.W.2d 841, 847 (1954) (likening
severance approach to husband retaining one-half portion as if parties had been divorced);
Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So. 2d 848, 850-51 (Fla. 1951) ("The Court pointed out in both cases
that the fiction of unity of estate is destroyed, and the estate severed, when the parties are divorced,
since it would be inequitable to allow one or the other to take all, all things being equal.").
23 See Grose v. Holland, 211 S.W.2d 464,467 (Mo. 1948) (noting principle purpose is still met
without breaking constitutional rights); Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757, 762
(Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (explaining court recognizes vested property rights in their slayer rule).
24 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006) ("The court shall consider any person convicted
of the unlawful killing of the decedent as predeceasing the decedent for the purpose of distribution
and disposition of the decedent's estate including property held between the person charged and
the decedent in joint tenancy or by tenancy in the entirety."); Estate of King, 52 N.W.2d 885, 889
(Wis. 1952) (describing approach as to one-half division); Colton v. Wade, 80 A.2d 923, 925 (Del.

248

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY [Vol. XXIV

identifies the murderer as predeceasing the victim in order to destroy
survivorship rights, and it is similar to the Severance approach as it
ultimately recognizes that the murderer only has a preexisting vested right in
one half of the property, thus giving the killer only what her or she is entitled
to. 2 5

HISTORY:
In common law, killers were expressly forbidden from inheriting
from their victims. 2 6 This was preceded by the doctrine of attainder, where
the person convicted of murder would forfeit his property to the king due to
"the corruption of the perpetrator's blood."2 7 As a part of the punishment,
the doctrine of forfeiture required all real and personal property of the
convicted to be forfeited. 28 The Corruption of Blood was a doctrine that
denied heirs to claim any property from the attained or murderer.29 These
doctrines essentially worked toward the idea that "a person who can neither

Ch. 1951) ("In equity he will be determined to hold the entire interest upon a constructive trust for
those other than the defendant entitled to the estate of his co-tenant by the entirety except that the
survivor is entitled to receive the commuted value of the net income of one-half of the property for
the number of years of his expectancy of life.").
25 See cases cited supra note 24 and accompanying text (describing similarities between two
approaches and Massachusetts slayer rule).
26 Alison Reppy, The Slayer's Bounty - History of Problem in Anglo-American Law, 19
N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 229, 241 (1942) ("[T]he common law doctrine of attainder, forfeiture, corruption
of blood and escheat .. . constituted a fairly satisfactory . .. solution to the problem of the slayer
and his bounty"); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 162 (noting at ancient common law ability of killer
to inherit was precluded); In re Estate of Foleno ex rel. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d
490, 493 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("The Slayer's Rule is of recent origin compared to other property
rules whose roots are often embedded in feudalism. 'In England, the common law doctrines of
attainder, forfeiture, corruption of blood and escheat played a prominent part in the solution of the
problem of the slayer and his bounty."').
27 See Reppy, supra note 26, at 231 (describing details of
doctrine of attainder); Hennessy,
supranote 18, at 162 (describing that person accused of capital murder was put in state of attainder).
The doctrine of attainder was used by the King to seize all property from a murderer to punish the
criminal and to prevent others from committing murder. Reppy, supranote 26, at 231.
28 See Reppy, supra note 26, at 232-33 (explaining doctrine of forfeiture and its reasoning for
taking all property); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 162 (requiring complete divestiture of
wrongdoer's real and personal property under doctrine of forfeiture).
29 See Reppy, supranote 26, at 233 (describing corruption of blood doctrine and how heirs are
restricted from inheriting); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 162 ("Corruption of blood was a feudal
doctrine that transferred the condemnation of the attained person to his heirs, 'unto the remotest
generation."'). The corruption of blood is where the accused's family was prohibited from
inheriting from accused's property. Reppy, supra note 26, at 233. The purpose of this was to
prevent the killer from transferring over his property because he committed murder. Id.
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hold, nor devise, nor inherit property is incapable of profiting from his
wrong."30
All of these doctrines were rendered impotent by the creation of the
U.S. Constitution.3 1 These doctrines were necessary to prevent injustices,
and their abolishment made it possible for killers to profit and inherit from
their victims. 3 2 The law had no way to prevent a killer from inheriting or
taking property from a victim.33 In the ensuing campaign to establish a slayer
rule to prevent killers from profiting from their crimes, a conflict between
law and equity emerged as states began to create slayer statutes to combat
34
the problem (at the time referred to as the "slayer and his bounty"). Fortyseven states have structured slayer statutes to try and tip-toe the line between
law and equity when restricting killers from inheriting property from their
victims." A majority of the states have tried to accomplish this by using a
severance approach, a constructive trust approach, or by prohibiting the
killer from accessing their property rights.36
In December 2002, Massachusetts approved a law entitled "Person
Charged with Unlawful Killing of Decedent Prohibited from Taking from
the Decedent's Estate."3 7 The statute prohibits anyone convicted of an
unlawful killing from taking from the decedent's estate through its
30 See Riggs v. Palmer, 22 N.E. 188, 190 (N.Y. 1889) (noting purpose behind these maxims);
Hennessy, supra note 18, at 162-63 ("The effect of this intergenerational condemnation was that a
wrongdoer was prevented from conveying, and his heirs from taking, any property through descent
or distribution.").
31 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting state from passing bill of Attainder); United
States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441 (1965) ("No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post
facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . ") (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
cl. 1). The doctrine of attainder is unconstitutional as it violates Art. I § 9 of the Constitution.
Brown, 381 U.S. at 440. The doctrine was banned to guard against dangers of it taking over the
legislative body's power of creating laws, by giving the legislature the task of rulemaking. Id. at

445-46.
32 See In re Estate of Foleno ex rel. Thomas v. Estate of Foleno, 772 N.E.2d 490,494 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2002) ("The abolishment of attainder, forfeiture, corruption of blood, and escheat thus left an
unanticipated void. No longer would the sovereign emerge to confiscate a killer's property, even
when the killer acquired the property by means of his crime.").
33 See id. (explaining there was no law after abolishment to restrict killer from inheriting).
34 See Reppy, supra note 26, at 229 (noting emergence of state laws protecting injustice
enrichment of killers).
" See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.4
(2003) (listing forty-seven states that have slayer statutes); Estate of Armstrong v. Armstrong, 170
So. 3d 510, 517 (Miss. 2015) ("Many states have enacted 'slayer statutes' intended to prevent a
person who has feloniously caused the death of a decedent from inheriting or receiving any part of
the estate of that decedent.").
36 See cases cited supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting cases that indicate states using
approach to balance law and equity).
37 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (stating title of Massachusetts slayer
statute).
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distribution and disposition.38 This includes any property held between the
person convicted and the decedent either in a joint tenancy or a tenancy by
the entirety. 39 The statute attempts to accomplish this purpose by classifying
the killer as having predeceased the decedent, including those who are part
of ajoint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.4 0 This applies to those convicted
of first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter. 4' This law
became effective on March 24, 2003 and is recognized as Massachusetts's
current slayer statute.42 The statute is effective because it prohibits a killer
from profiting from their crime. 43 The Massachusetts slayer statute is similar
to other states' slayer statutes, but differs in classifying the killer as having
predeceased the victim." Other states have recognized and avoided the
constitutional violations behind determining that the killer predeceases the
decedent in cases ofjoint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety.4 5 In regards to
the joint tenancy and tenancy by the entirety, Massachusetts's slayer statute
goes well beyond barring a criminal from profiting from a crime.' The
statute violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution."
ANALYSIS:
The Massachusetts slayer statute is unconstitutional because it
violates the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.4 8 One
See id. (noting specific purpose behind enactment).
39 See id. (stating its inclusion ofjoint tenancies and tenancies by the entirety).
' See id (explaining its approach to accomplishing its purpose). The approach behind
deeming the killer to have predeceased the decedent is to make it as though the killer died before
the deceased, thus giving all the property rights to the decedent. Id
41 See id. (noting that it applies to certain crimes). "It shall not include vehicular homicide or
negligent manslaughter in the death of the decedent." Id
42 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (mentioning relevant enactment
date in amendments).
43 See Wade, supra note 14, at 725-26 (stating specific purpose of slayer statute).
4 See William M. McGovern, Jr., Homicide and Succession to Property, 68 MICH. L. REV.
65, 86 (1969) ("All authorities agree ... that the murderer should be allowed to keep whatever right
he may have during his lifetime to the income from the property, since that interest is not acquired
because of the crime."); see also Hennessy, supra note 18, at 160 (noting difference of
Massachusetts slayer rule is its approach).
45 See Wade, supra note 14, at 715 (describing that states have structured their statutes with
attention to possible constitutional violations).
4 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2017) (stating slayer rule); see also Wade,
supra note 14, at 715 (explaining that taking away vested property rights is unconstitutional).
47 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating no deprivation of property without due process of law);
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (stating due process clause).
48 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that vested property interests cannot be deprived without
due process of law); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2018) (stating relevant slayer
38
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purpose of the Fifth Amendment is to protect an individual's property
rights.4 9 Once someone has a vested property right, it cannot be taken away
or forfeited.so The Fifth Amendment gives every individual that right
The
regardless of whether that individual committed murder."
Massachusetts slayer statute is just and correct in its purpose of preventing
criminals from inheriting from the estate of those they have killed, but
incorrect in its forfeiture of one's vested property rights.52 The murderer
does not deserve to benefit from his or her crime, but they do deserve to be
protected by the rights our forefathers established in the Constitution. 5 3
The estate of the deceased should by all means be protected from
murderers, however, a vested property interest should not be taken away in
its entirety.54 The Massachusetts slayer statute should not disregard a joint
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety because they create vested property
rights." They provide the parties with a vested property right that cannot be
rule); Wade, supra note 14, at 735-38 (explaining unconstitutionality of forfeiting vested property
rights); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 160 (noting that Massachusetts slayer statute is
unconstitutional); McGovern, supra note 44, at 86 (explaining that it is unconstitutional to take
away individual's property interest).
49 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating no deprivation of property without due process of law).
50 See id (explaining that one's right to his or her vested property interest is protected); Wade,
supra note 14, at 715 (noting that vested property rights cannot be taken away following crime);
McGovern, supra note 44, at 86 (noting that vested property rights should not be forfeited).
51 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing individuals protected right to property); McGovern,
supra note 44, at 86 (explaining that vested interest cannot be taken away because that person
committed murder).
52 See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (LexisNexis 2018) (stating slayer statute); Hennessy,
supra note 18, at 181 ("The Massachusetts slayer statute prevents a killer from inheriting from their
victim but does not keep in mind the constitutional rights of the killer.").
53 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 46 (2006) (stating no murderer may benefit from
committing a crime); Colton, 80 A.2d at 925 (stating slayer shall not gain profit from crime);
Slocum, 139 N.E. at 817 (explaining slayer should not benefit from committing crime as it would
be against public policy); Hennessy, supranote 18, at 181 ("In passing such a law, the drafters have
ignored more than a century of case law from other jurisdictions that carefully balanced the need
to honor the interests that citizens have in their property with the indisputable moral justification
for denying slayers the right to succeed to their victims' property.").
5 See Wade, supra note 14, at 725-26 (stating if interest is vested, it cannot be taken away
without violating constitutional provisions); Barnett v. Couey, 27 S.W.2d 757, 762
(Mo. Ct. App. 1930) (stating that slayer rule has recognizable vested rights); Hennessy, supranote
18, at 173 ("If it is accepted that a slayer is not actually being deprived of property at all, due
process protections are not violated. Likewise, a statute that deprives a defendant of no vested
property interest will likely not be considered punitive and thus will not form the basis of a double
jeopardy claim. The conclusion to be drawn, therefore, is that a statute that solely prevents a slayer
from acquiring property from her victim and does not take any property from her is constitutional.
By the same token, a statute depriving a slayer of a vested property interest will be unconstitutional.
Such a deprivation may be both an impermissible forfeiture and a violation of other constitutional
protections, such as the prohibitions against double jeopardy.").
5 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1009 ("A slayer statute should only be used to prevent a killer
from receiving the property of the victim and joint tenancy property is owned, at least in part, by
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taken away without violating their constitutional rights. 56 A joint tenancy
and tenancy by the entirety both create vested property rights that are not
transferable. 57 A tenancy by the entirety is made between a husband and
wife, giving each of them full and non-transferable property rights."
An exception to this would apply when a husband or wife kills the
other in order to inherit from the deceased person's estate. 59 The exception
could follow the Severance approach in which the property, of which both
parties have a vested interest, will be severed in half.o One half of the
property interest would be given to the murderer and the other half would be

the killer."); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 181 ("Rather than severing the interests in the property or
imposing an equitable trust, the Massachusetts statute explicitly requires that property held jointly
or by the entirety be distributed as if the slayer had predeceased the decedent. The consequence of
this approach is that, by operation of law, all property interests, including vested interests, held by
a surviving joint tenant are forfeited by operation of the statute.").
56 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1009 ("Joint tenancy is defined as ownership 'by several
persons in equal shares by a title created by a single will or transfer, when expressly declared in the
will or transfer to be a joint tenancy. Joint tenants have the right of survivorship, meaning that no
probate or other proceeding is necessary to pass the property to the surviving joint tenants on death.
This right was deemed to exist because the joint tenants, as a group, are deemed to own the property.
Under this theory, each of the joint tenants owns the undivided whole of the property. When one
member of the group dies, nothing transfers from the deceased to the other joint tenants. Rather,
the ownership of the property continues in the joint tenant group, albeit now reduced in number by
the loss of the decedent.").
57 See id. (explaining interests created byjoint tenancy); Hennessy, supranote 18, at 181 ("The
Massachusetts slayer rule when applied to joint tenants and tenants by the entirety, it divests a
perpetrator of property in which he has a vested and preexistent legal interest.").
5 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1009 (explaining that survivorship rights exist under joint
tenancy); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 175 ("When one joint tenant dies the surviving tenant owns
the entire estate by operation of her right of survivorship. Therefore, a slayer has a substantially
greater interest in property held jointly with a right of survivorship, whether as a joint tenant or as
a tenant by the entirety, than she has in the nonvested expectancy interest that she stands to inherit
by will or intestacy.").
5 See Hennessy, supra note 18, at 175 (stating that slayer has greater interest in property

jointly held).
6 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1011 ("Any joint tenant who feloniously and intentionally kills
another joint tenant thereby effects a severance of the interest of the decedent so that the share of
the decedent passes as his property and the killer has no rights by survivorship."); Hennessy, supra
note 18, at 177 ("A judicial or statutory severance of the joint interest is the most common solution
to the slayer problem. Various rationales support this result. For instance, in cases of tenancy by
the entirety, courts have observed that a felonious killing is analogous to a divorce or marriage
dissolution in that a murderous spouse willfully dissolves the marital relationship, thereby
destroying the essential element of marriage. This act severs the tenancy and the slayer loses his
right of survivorship. In the case ofjoint tenancies, courts have found the justification for severance
by parsing out the relevant interests held by a surviving joint tenant. In so doing, courts have
observed that, notwithstanding the fiction that the right of survivorship delivers nothing to the
survivor, an additional interest is in fact realized in the succession from joint to sole ownership. To
the extent that such a gain is cognizable, statutes and the equitable powers of the court can prevent
a slayer from so profiting from his wrong.").
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given to the descendants of the deceased.6 1 A joint tenancy or tenancy by
the entirety will thus lose its survivorship rights and become a tenancy in
common, where a one-half interest of the property can be transferred.62 This
ensures that the murderer's constitutional rights are not violated as he or she
still receives one-half interest in the marital property, and the deceased's
descendants receive one-half interest from the estate because the killer's act
terminates all survivorship rights.63 For example, if a wife kills her husband,
she will be barred by the slayer statute from inheriting from his estate, but
she will still have a one-half property interest in the marital property that
they shared under a tenancy by the entirety.' The husband's one-half
interest in the property will be given to his descendants, and the wife's
constitutional right will not be violated.6 5
There are many states that currently follow the Severance
approach.6 6 These states have recognized the constitutional violations that
are created when taking away all property rights from the murderer, and have
thus incorporated the severance theory, which splits the property in half, into
their slayer statutes.67 The Severance approach and Constructive Trust
approach appear to be the most comprehensive solutions in regard to

61 See Hennessy, supra note 18, at 177 ("An unlawful act causes a severance of the tenancy,
thus allowing the slayer to retain only a one-half share - not to acquire the remainder of the jointly
owned interest as he normally would."); Myers, supra note 19, at 1012 ("The estate of the victim
will hold a life estate in the other half of the property and the remainder interest in the property.").
62 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1009-11 ("Under the common law, joint tenancies required the
existence of the "four unities" of interest, title, time, and possession to exist equally for all joint
tenants at the same time. A failure in one of these unities would cause the ownership of the property
to transmute to a tenancy in common. Joint tenants could convert the joint tenancy to a tenancy in
common at any time by destroying anyone of the four unities. The statute provided that when the
killing of a joint tenant affects a severance of that tenancy, the severance of a joint tenancy results
in the tenancy in common.").
63 See id. at 1020 (noting that North Dakota slayer statute voids survivorship rights when
slaying exists).
6 See id. at 998 ("Enolf Snortland's estate included property that he and Robert held in joint
tenancy. Applying the UPC as then effective in North Dakota, the district court ruled that the joint
tenancy property was severed into equal shares of tenancy in common property, with Enolf
Snortland's estate taking one share and Robert taking the other... The court also ruled that Robert's
son, Robbie, would receive the intestate share that Robert would have inherited. This changed the
treatment ofjoint tenancy property when one of the joint tenants kills another.").
65 See id. (explaining survivorship rights are forfeited and half interest is distributed to killer
and descendant's estate); Hennessy, supra note 18, at 176 (stating that killer will only receive half
interest).
66 See Hennessy, supranote 18, at 160 ("Deeming murderous joint tenants and tenants by the
entirety to have legally predeceased the decedent implicates constitutional concerns that other states
have carefully avoided for more than a century.").
67 See Myers, supra note 19, at 1020 (stating that North Dakota amended its slayer statute in
2007 to implement severance approach).
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protecting an individual's constitutional rights while also barring them from
profiting from their crime.68
CONCLUSION:
The Massachusetts slayer statute has the purpose of barring
murderers from profiting from their crimes. While it successfully fulfills this
purpose, it does so by violating the constitutional rights of individuals who
have a vested property interest through a joint tenancy or tenancy by the
entirety. The Massachusetts slayer statute unconstitutionally deprives these
individuals of a vested property interest that they are rightfully entitled to,
and that they share with their husband or wife. The slayer statute violates
the Fifth Amendment as it deprives an individual of their constitutionally
protected property. It is necessary for Massachusetts to amend their slayer
statute with the intention of making sure no constitutional rights are being
violated. Specifically, Massachusetts needs to ensure that an individual who
is privy to a tenancy by the entirety or joint tenancy maintains his or her right
to the vested property interest. A Severance approach theory should be used
to protect one's constitutional rights and to ensure the property is distributed
fairly between the surviving spouse and the descendant's estate.
Massachusetts must amend its slayer statute in order to discontinue violating
the rights the Constitution seeks to protect.
PaulMourad

68 See Hennessy, supra note 18, at 176-77 ("Two dominant approaches have emerged from
these articulations. Under the first approach, an unlawful act causes a severance of the tenancy,
thus allowing the slayer to retain only a one-half share - not to acquire the remainder of the jointly
owned interest as he normally would. Under the second, the unlawful act causes some portion of
the jointly held property to be held in a constructive trust for the heirs of the deceased, often limiting
the slayer's retention to a one-half interest for life. The ultimate goal under both of these approaches
is to prevent the slayer from benefiting in any way from his act.").

